The Marine Corps' plan to fast track[[is that fair? GH // YES, EXPEDITING THE REVIEWS // LMB]] the development of its next-generation amphibious vehicle shift Amphibious Combat Vehicle acquisition into high gear could mean some design and mechanical [[OK? GH // yes//lmb ]]development problems common to all systems might not emerge until after the first systems hit the fleet, according to a government watchdog agency Congress’ investigative arm.
As the The Marine Corps prepares this month to select two competitors to produce prototypes of its Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1, the Government Accountability Office commended the service for following best practices tied to major acquisition programs. But the GAO is also warning Marine officials to keep an eye later this month will narrow five Amphibious Combat Vehicle competitors down to two. Each will build 16 prototypes for in-depth tests that will last into 2018 in a bid to provide amphibious assault forces. The Government Accounting Office has generally considered the ACV program a success and its Oct. 28 report commended the Corps’ use of "best practices," but GAO took issue on a two key points.
Developing the first round of First is that initial ACVs will be developed before the preliminary design review is complete. This "poses risk," according the Oct. 28 report states. That could result in and could require costly modifications down the road aid.
The service's plan to The plan combines preliminary and critical design reviews and critical design review into one event — just roughly 90 days after development begins — . GAO said this leaves too little time to address any issues, the report states. GAO officials cited identified, and pointed to the canceled billion Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program as an example of what the Marine Corps should not repeat proof. The EFV's critical design review CDR was conducted at a similar stage period, but prototype testing continued for three years — long after the findings could inform the design CDR decision. ACV acquisition started in 2011 after the EFV was canceled. The Corps spent $3.7 billion over 15 years on that program, which was later deemed too expensive to maintain. After 15 years, the $3.7 billion program was deemed too expensive to maintain.
"If the ACV 1.1 does not demonstrate the expected amphibious capabilities, then more development than currently anticipated may be required for ACV 1.2 to achieve ship-to-shore amphibious capability and greater effort may be needed to retrofit ACV 1.1 vehicles to achieve the same capabilities," the report said.
Lockheed displayed its Amphibious Combat Vehicle prototype at the Modern Day Marine expo in Quantico, Va., in September. A new report from the Government Accountability Office warns the Marine Corps against developing the first round of the next-generation amphibious before completing preliminary design reviews.
Photo Credit: Mike Morones/Staff
Second is the Corps' plan to conduct development testing and production at the same time. Because a production decision is expected in fiscal 2018, Congress would likely have to approve initial production funds in February 2017 — about the same time that ACV prototypes are delivered.
Lawmakers have shown increasing frustration with military leaders who ask for program funding while providing but offer little to no testing data. Such an approach wasted $14 billion on the Army’s failed Future Combat System, which was laden with new technologies that never worked ey never could get to work. And the Navy’s new Ford-class carriers are estimated to be more than $6 billion over budget. Delivery of the first ship will be at least eight months late.
Marine officials with the Corps' Program Executive Office Land Systems expressed appreciation for the rigor the GAO put into reviewing the program. Manny Pacheco, a spokesman for the Marine Corps' PEO Land Systems, said many of GAO's findings validate the service's acquisition strategy.
"We appreciate the rigor that the GAO put into reviewing our program and many of their findings validate our acquisition strategy," said Manny Pacheco, a spokesman for the Marine Corps' Program Executive Office Land Systems Marine Corps. "We also respect the concerns that GAO expressed in some of their findings and are confident that we have processes in place to address those concerns if they become an issue," he said.
Pentagon officials said GAO’s report "appears to underestimate ACV 1.1’s planned technical maturity and associated risks" and argued that the ACV is beyond traditional preliminary and critical design reviews. Unlike new systems that can be delayed as technologies are developed, this is a modified design of proven systems, and that will reduce fiscal and developmental risk.[[Lance, I'm not entirely sure what this graph means. Can we try to rephrase? GH]]
"It is important to note that this is not a developmental program but rather the acquisition of a modified system that has been fielded by other countries, and the Marine Corps conducted extensive testing and demonstrations during the previous Marine Personnel Carrier program over the last five to six years," Pacheco said.
Readiness tests in realistic environments have proved promising, Technology readiness assessments for the ACV have been strong and most have been demonstrated in an operational environment, but the GAO still urged caution. The vehicle's For example, the ACV’s Rremote Wweapon Sstation has shown itself worthy in a number of infantry and armored systems, for example. But its the ability to function and be maintained in a maritime environment is something far different, and could result in a "significant impact on system reliability," the report states.
The Corps plans to field outfit six battalions with 200 ACVs starting around 2020. The service will also update by 2023, and modernize its aging fleet of amphibious assault vehicles for other units enough AAVs to outfit another four battalions. That would give the service the ability to put 10 battalions ashore during a forcible entry. The GAO warned that any delay to ACV 1.1 delivery would require the Marine Corps to make significant changes to its the amphibious strategy, and would mean more shifting deliveries would require more AAVs would need to be upgraded service-life extensions or reduced assets.
ACV development, which has been called the service's top priority, includes three incremental increases of amphibious capability.
The ACV 1.1 is expected to cost up to $7.5 million each and to reach initial operational capability in 2020. It is envisioned as an eight-wheeled vehicle that would seat at least 10 combat Marines and handle 2-foot waves. Marine officials tout improved protected land mobility, but critics point out the limited amphibious capability means surface connector craft will be needed to get the ACV from ship to shore.
The ACV 1.2 variant looks to beef up the displacement hull vehicle to match the AAV’s amphibious capabilities, and add more internal space. ACV 2.1 looks to add high-water speed by the mid-2020s, perhaps matching the high-water speed that was a hallmark of the EFV.
Five companies — Advanced Defense Vehicle Systems, BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, Lockheed Martin, and SAIC — have designed ACV 1.1 prototypes. They are: Advanced Defense Vehicle Systems, BAE Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, Lockheed Martin, and SAIC.
